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THE ILLINOIS DREAM AcT: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
NIGHTMARE 
l. INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of immigration rd(mn debates across the countrv, 1 
Illinois h~1s enacted an it~dkctivc piece of immigration lcgislatio;1. 2 
Illinois Senate Bill 2 HiS, popularly named the Illinois DREAM Act, 
muddies the ~1lrcady murky waters surrounding immigration rd(mn. 3 
Bill 218S was signed into Illinois law bv Governor Pat Quinn on 
August 1, 2011: codifying it as Publi~ Act 97-233.4 While the 
paramount issue surrounding immigration rdl:m11 is citizenship 
status, s this Act mandates the creation of an Illinois DREAM Fund 
Commission to establish scholarships f()r studcnts,6 create programs 
to train high school counselors on how to address "the needs of ... 
children of immigrants, "7 and make college tuition s~wings programs 
available to anyone. K Y ct this legislation is a constitutional nightmare, 
and portions of it must be repealed. This Note will outline the 
violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Federal Constitution pcrpctr~ltcd by this Act so 
that the Illinois Legislature on remedy them bd()rC there is an 
embarrassing judici~1l mandate, which would expend time, money, 
and resources in unnecessary litigation. The Legislature must ensure 
that scholarship tlmds arc administered to those who need and 
deserve them by a means that docs not violate the United States 
Constitution. 
I. Sec Sam Youngman, Ob.zm;z l!rj':CS Actil'l:\·t\· to l'rcs.wrc Clmgrns on lmmigr.ltl(JII 
Rc!imn, T!IF HILL (Apr. I 9, 2011 ), http://thehill.com/hommcwsjadministDtion/l S6H69-
' 'bam a -11 rges-activists- t< ,. press 11 re-o lll grcss-< m- i m m i gra ti< m. 
2. Illinois DREAM Act, Pub. Act No. 97-233 (2011 ). 
3. !d 
4. S. 21 KS, '!7th l;m. Assemh. 1 Ill. 20 II J, .w.u!:zhlc ;It 
http:/ jwww.ilga.g<Jv/kgislation/Bii!Sutus.asp11)ocNum= 21 K5&l;AII)= II & l)ocTypeiD=SB 
&Sessi<mii)=X4&GA='l7. 
5. .~(·c Peter Nicholas, 0/wn.z {ookJiJg ro Git'<' New !.ik to lmmip;ution Rcfimn, 
I .. A. TLvlES (JvLlr. 4, 20 I 0), http://articles.latimes.com/20 I 0/mar/04/nationjb-na-
immigr.JtionS-20 I Omar05. 
6. 110 ILL. COM!'. STAT. '!47/67 (2011 ). 
7. 105 ILL. OlMI'. STAT. 5/21-2S(e)(5) (2011 ). 
X. .~(·c IS ILL. COM!'. STAT. 505/16.5 (2011) (allowing anyone with a \',liid Soci.tl 
Securin· numhn or THpavn ldemiticttion Number to he digihk f(n· these programs). 
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It is important to note that the Illinois DREAM Act<J should not 
be confused with the federal DREAM Act; 10 despite the similarity in 
title, these two pieces of legislation arc, in bet, quite ditkrcnt. The 
Federal DREAM Act was, and may be, II an Act with the main 
purpose of adjusting the status of illegal immigrant-students who 
meet specific critcri~l, thereby allowing them to apply for residency 
status.I2 The Illinois Act,I3 however, otters no means to adjust one's 
residency status.I4 
This Note's primary f(xus will be that of the Illinois DREAM 
Act, in particular its creation of the DREAM Fund Commission 
through the state IS in violation of the Equal Protection Clause .1 6 The 
statute charges the Commission with creating a scholarship giving 
specific guidelines on eligibility to receive these scholarships. 17 The 
requirements arc that a student must: 
<J. Illinois DREAM Act, Pub. Act No. <J7-233 (20 II). 
10. Sec DREAM Act of 2011, S. <JS2, !12th Cong. (2011). This is the most recc:nth· 
proposed version of the DREAM Act. This version has only been introduced and h:ts nor hem 
voted on in either chamber as of February 4, 20 II. /d. The tldl title of the Act is the 
lk\'t~lopment, Relict~ and Educ1tion f(H- Alien Minors Act of 20 II, Bill Summary :md Status, 
S. <)52, !12th Con g. (20 II), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquerv/IVd 112: I: ./temp/-hdtiJHf: (i:v(cv(ro l ,&summ2= m& I /home/! .cgisbtiveD:lta.php I 
, and would c1llow an individtd who docs not have a legal status in the United States to "cancel 
I their I remm•:1l . and adjust to the status of an alien lawtidlv admitted t(H· permanent 
residence on cl conditional bc1sis" if they meet various requirements, most important!\·, lu\·itlg a 
high school diploma or equivalent, S. <JS2, !12th Cong. § 3(h )(I) ( 20 II). The conditional 
permanc:nt rcsidc:nt status would bst f(>r six years, during which time they would he eligible ti>r 
citizc:nship status. !d. Sponsor Smator Richard Durbin cnvision.s this Acr ,Js giving voung 
people an opportunity to contribute to Amcriu, instead of punishing them f(>r being "brought 
to the U.S. as children" without any sav in the matter. l'cl.\SJil,!{ rhc J)/UcAAf Acr, DI<K 
DURBIN, US SENATOR FOR [I.LI:--.:OIS ASSISTANT MAJORITY LEADER (Feb. 4, 2011 ), 
http:/ fdu rbi n.scnate. g< >V /pu hi ic/i ndc:x .di11/l1< >t- t< >pies?( :ontent Record_ id = 43eaa I 36-a3de-
4d72-hcl b-12c300010ae<J. Regardless of the reasons or supporting arguments behind the 
proposed Bill, Senator Durbin puts ti>rth a solution and docs so through the proper channels 
that have the power, mcc1ns, am! authority to dkctuatc such a policy: Congress. L\UR,\ 
HUNTER DIFJ'/, ET AI.., 3A AM. )UK. 21l A!J(nl :znd CJ'rizcns § 21\2. 
II. Sec DREAM Act of 20 II, S. %2, !12th Con g. (2011 ), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquerv/D?d I 12: I: .ftemp/-bdtiJHf: (a1(ro(cv l .&summ2=m& I /home/! .egislativcl hta.php 
(stating that the hill is still in committee). 
12. Sec DREAM Act of 2010, S. 3<J<J2, !lith Cong. (2010) (passing the House of 
Representatives but stopped bv a filibuster). 
13. Illinois DREAM Act, Pub. Act No. <J7-233 (20 II). 
14. Sec 110 [LI.. C0:\11'. STAT. <J47/67 (2011) (nothing in the Act changing citizcm.hip 
stcltUS ). 
15. Sec id. <J47/67(a) (2011) (creating the Commission). 
16. U.S. Col'-:sT. amend. XIV. 
17. 110 ILL. CO.'vll'. STAT. <J47f67(b) (2011). 
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(I) Have resided with his or her parents or guardian while 
attending a public or private high school in I Illinois I· 
( 2) Have graduated tl-om a public or private high school or received 
the equivalent of ~l high school diploma in j Illinois I· 
( 3) Ha\T attended school in I Illinois I f(>r at least 3 wars ~1s of the 
date he or she graduated tl-om high school or received the 
equivalent of a high school diploma. 
( 4) H~we at least one parent who immigr~lted to the United 
States. IX 
177 
These requirements create a classification based on national 
origin, violating the Equal Protection Clause, and, accordingly, must 
bee strict scrutiny. 1 9 The strict scrutiny test requires that a 
compelling government interest be served and that the means of 
achieving th~lt interest be narrowly tailored to the compelling 
interest. 20 This statute hils to serve ~l compelling government interest 
and is not narrowly tailored even if such an interest did exist. for 
conf1icting with the fourteenth Amendment, this portion of the Act 
must be immediately innlidatcd fix being unconstitutional. 2! 
This Note will analyze the conf1ict between Illinois Compiled 
Statute Chapter 110, Act 947, Section 67-thc portion of the lllinois 
DREAM Act creating a scholarship-~md b~1sic principles stated in 
the fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Part I 
consists of a brief overview of the Equal Protection Clause and its 
general applicability. Part II addresses how the Act meets the state 
action requirements needed f(>r an equal protection atulysis. This is 
done by establishing the appropriate standard of review f(>r this type 
of constihttional violation and addressing the classification created, 
the government's interest in this legislation, and how tailored the 
actions of the legislative body arc in achieving their interest. 
following the Part II analysis, the Conclusion will discuss the 
problems created by this legislation and how this analysis will afkct 
legislation in other jurisdictions, as well as provide a suggested 
IX. !d <J47/67(c). 
I <J. .~iT Wvgant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (I <JX6) C1pplving strict 
scrutinv ;Jmlvsis to "ethnic origin," imerclunging it with "natiotul origin"). 
20. .~iT Parents Involved in Cmtv. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I, SSI U.S. 701, 702 
(2007) (citing Adarand Constructor.s, Inc. v. l'ena, SIS U.S. 200 (l<J<JS)) (,micuLning the 
strict .scrutim· test). 
21. Sec Loving \'. Virginia, 3XX U.S. I, 2 (I 967) (sunm: invalidated f(>r being 
incon.si.stcnt with the hntrtcenth Amendment). 
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remedy of how the sponsors and co-sponsors of this bill could 
establish the proposed scholarship in a way that docs not violate the 
Constitution. 
II. EQUAL PROTECJ"ION ANALYSIS 
The Equal Protection Clause is fi:nmd in section one of the 
fourteenth Amendment and states that "In ]o state shall ... deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. "22 
Historically, this allowed f()r separate treatment along class lines as 
long as it was cqual,23 until Brown v. Hoard of" bduc:ztion was 
decided, overruling the separate but equal ideology and paving the 
way f(:>r the current equal protection analysis. 24 The current analysis 
is such that there must be some f(mn of state action25 seeking to 
achieve a goal, by which a classification amongst its people is created. 
A subsequent analysis is then done to address the groups being 
classified to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to 
the classification. 
A. State Action 
The fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
applies to st~ltc action, not "merely private conduct. "26 When 
"cnf(xccmcnt of a statute, on its t:Kc, I is I racially discriminatory,"27 
"compliance with a statute I commands I a private entity to 
discriminatc,"2il or an "agent of the state" acts discrimin~uorily,2<J 
state action exists. 30 When private actors arc pcrf()rming a public 
f\.mction, they arc also deemed to meet the state action 
22. U.S. OlNST. amend. XIV,~ l. 
23. Sec l'kssv v. t'crguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540 (IH<J6) (allowing separate hut equal 
tre:ltment), m·cJTulcd /wBrown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 4H3 (l<J54). 
24. 5(·c Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 4X3 (I <J54) (invalidating separate hut equal 
tre:ltment). 
25. Recent Developments, Clmsrinmim;~/ L1w-Sr:uc Acrion /)rlfJrtiJc !Jwoknl ;~s :1 
I~Iinir:uion upon rhc Ruch oF rhc f(Jilrtccnrh Amendment, 25 VA~ll. L. REV. 1237, 1237 
( l <J72) ("IT !he Supreme Court has consistently hdd that state action is <l necessary element of 
a t(Hirteenth amendment violation"). 
26. !d. 
27. ld at 123H. 
28. ld 
2<J. !d. 
30. ld at l 23<J. 
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requirement.'" Additi01ully, courts can find the state acnon 
requirement satisfied under a theory of entanglement-where the 
private actor is entangled with the state32-or entwinement-when 
the state encourages or has "a symbiotic relationship" with a private 
actor. 33 
H. Cb.~:~itications and 1l1cir Corrcspon(!Ii1g Tests 
Once state action has been established, an analysis of the basis of 
the cbssification becomes necessary to determine ~onstitutionalitv. 34 
The process begins by identifying. the source of the classiticatio;1. 35 
These classifications can be manifest in one of three wavs: ( l) 
Through a hcially discriminatory statute or policy; 36 (2) Through a 
t:Kially neutral, but administratively discriminatory statute; 37 or ( 3) 
Through a f~Ki~1lly and administratively neutral statute that has a 
discriminatory impact coupled with a discriminatory intent. 3H 
After establishing the method of discrimination amongst the 
cbssitications, the characteristics that distinguish one group from the 
other must be scrutinized."9 Different characteristics require diftcrent 
3 I. Recent I kvdopments, supt:znote 25, at I 239. 
32. .~(·c Evans v. Newton, 3H2 U.S. 296, 30I (I 966) (the sure's transkr of a p;lrk to a 
priV;lte trustee while the p;lrk was still being mainuined bv the state entangled the state 
sufticientl\· to meet the state action requirement). 
33. Sec Brentwood Acad. v·. Tcnn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 53 I U.S. 2HH, 305 
(200I) (Thonus, )., dissmting) (explaining mtwinemcnt: "a private organiz;ltion's acts .. 
constitute state ;lction . . when the organization ... created, coerced, or I is I eneouraged by 
the government; or acted in ;l symbiotic relationship with the government."). 
34. Sec Jmnikr A. LltT.lbel', "J)WH (lJrit·inp. While H!:zck)".znd hpt;z/l'rotccttim: Jhc 
Re;z/ities o{;zn Unconstitutionzfl'olice l'rxticc, 6 ).L. & POI'Y 2<JI, 306 (1997) (illustrating 
how ;liter state ;Ktion is established, classification must be addressed). 
35. Sec Bowen v. Gilliard, 4H3 U.S. 587,602 (I<J87) (emphasizing the need to identify 
the class being "disadvantaged" bd(n-c atuly~eing it). 
36. Sec Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. I<JO (I<J76) (illustrating a statute th;lt is EKi.1llv 
discrimin;ltorv: "prohibiting the sale of ... beer to males under the age of 2 I and to ti:maks 
under the ;lge of 18"). 
37 . . ~(·eYick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,362 (1886) (showing that, while licmsing 
is ;ln example of a bciallv neutral law, rejecting only Chinese applicants demonstrates 
"discriminations in the administr;ltion of the ordinance"). 
38. .~(xWashington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,230 (I<J76) (showing that police exam was 
acceptable despite h,wing a discriminatory imp;Kt (blacks did worse than whites on the exam) 
becll!se the exam was bcially neutLll, ;ldministered in a neutral wav, and did not have an 
intentional discriminatory impact). 
39. Sec Unitl'd Sutes v. C:arokne !'rods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, I S3 n.4 ( 1938) (stating 
that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities mav be a special condition, which tends 
seriouslv ro curtail the opcr;ltion of those politic1l processes ordinarilv to be relied upon to 
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levels of protection, with the degree of protection contingent upon 
the ability of the class or group to protect itself politically or the 
biological differences inherent in those characteristics. 40 The 
classifications arc as f()llows: suspect classifications, quasi-suspect 
classifications, and all other classifications. A classification based on a 
suspect classification,41 or ftmdamcntal right,42 requires the 
application of a strict scrutiny tcst. 43 The courts have articulated that 
these classifications arc "in most instances irrelevant to anv 
constitutionally acceptable legislative purpose "44 and must be 
"narrowly tailored to ftirthcr a compelling governmental interest. "45 
If a classification is drawn based upon gender, a quasi-suspect class, 
the method crc<lting the classification is subject to intermediate 
scrutiny.46 This requires that an important government interest must 
exist, and the method of achieving that interest must be substantially 
related to that intcrcst.47 The justification t(x this lower level of 
scrutiny is that courts have recognized that biological differences exist 
between the genders that would support sex-based classifications.4H 
All other classifications, such as those based on "age, socioeconomic 
status, and mental disability arc subject to rational basis review. "4<J 
Rational basis review requires that these non-suspect classifications 
protect minorities, and which may call t<>r a correspondingly more searching judicial inquin·" 
and thereby est<lblishing that different classitications need to be <lll(micd diHcTent levels of 
protection). 
40. ,kc Marcv Strau", Rccv;i/wtil~l'; Suspect CI:J.\siliutions, 35 SEJ\TJTE LJ. I .. REV. 
135, 13<J (20 II) ("IS lome courts ,\IT exclusively concerned wirh the 'discrete and imui<lr' 
nature of the group, others t(JCus on immut<lbility of the group's characteristics, and still others 
.1re mostly concerned with the group\ history of discrimination" when .1ddre"ing wlur level of 
scrutinv to .1pplv). 
41. ,~(·c San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 105 (I<J73) 
(identit\·ing race, nationalirv, <llld aliemge as suspect cla"iticarions). 
42. ld at I (staring rhar tlmdamental rights require,\ compelling interest). 
4::l. ,~(·c Plyler \'. Doc, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (I<JS2) (staring that suspect classes and 
tlmdamental rights need to be precisely tailored to,\ compelling government interest -the .strict 
scrutim· rest). 
44. Acbrand Consrructor.s, Inc. v.l'cna, 515 U.S. 200,216 (I<J<J5). 
45. Shaw v. Reno, SO<J U.S. 6JO, 6::l I (I <J<J3 ). 
46. .~(·c United States v. Virginia, 5 I H lJ .S. 515, 571 (I <J<J6) ("I W le evaluate a 
staturorv cbssitication based on sex under ... 'intermediate scrutinv'"). 
47. Jd 
4H. ,~(·c Nguven v. lmmi!',r<ltion & NaturaliL<ltion Serv., 5::l3 U.S. 53 (2001) (allowing 
gender classiticarions beuusc of biological dittcrcnces between male.s .md knules; a kmale is 
guaranteed to know about her child due ro rhe bet rhat she will give birth to the child, while 
the Lither ma\' not even know he has a child). 
4<J. Strauss, Sllf'l~l note 40, at 146. 
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serve ~1 legitimate government interest and be rationally related to 
that interest. 5° Classifications based on rational basis arc rardv 
overturned, S 1 while classifications subject to strict scrutiny ~1rc ustDlly 
"strict in theory, but f:1tal in f:Kt,"S 2 making identification of the 
classification increasingly important in determining the outcome of 
an equal protection analysis. 53 
Ill. TilE ILLINOIS DREAM ACT: EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS 
A. 11/inoi~·' State Action 
Illinois Smatc Bill 2 I 85 was introduced bv Senator John 
Culkrton on february 2, 20 ll. S4 The Bill was pass~d by the Illinois 
Senate on May 4, 20 ll by a vote of forty-five to ckvm. ss The I louse 
of Representatives on May 30, 20 ll approved the Bill in a vote of 
sixty-one to fitty-thrccY1 The Bill was signed into law by Governor 
Quinn on August l, 20 ll. S7 The moment the Bill was signed into 
law, the eligibility requirements t(Jr the scholarship limiting 
participation to certain individualsSR became codified ~md 
enf()rceablc, meeting the state action requirement f(:>r an equal 
protection ~malysis. S<J 
Alternatively, if state action is not established from mere 
codification, then the DREAM fund Commission's actions would 
meet the state action requirement under a public function theory.60 
SO. Cin· of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,432 ( l<JRS). 
S I. C:hc1b M. Patterson, Ttj>s thr the J)uc l'rocc.1s Cinl Rt~htl Cm:, l'RM:. Li\IV 7 
( Dec. I '!'!6). 
S2. htllilove v. Klut~enick, 44R U.S. 44R, Sl<J (l<JROJ (l'owcll, )., concurring) (citing 
Regcnrs ofUniv. ofC1Iif. v. Bakke, 43R U.S. 26S, 362 ( 1'!7RJ). 
S3. !d. (urili~eing the "Elul in t:Kt" phrc1sing to illustrate how strict scrutiny amlvsis arc 
usuc11lv not 0\Trcomc). 
S4. S. 21 RS, '!7th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 20 II), 
hrrp:/ jwww.ilga.g<>v/kgislarion/BiiiSurus.asp)] )<>cNum=21 RS&l;AJI )=II &D<>cTvpeJ])= SB 
&Session]])= R4&GA ='!7. 
SS. Jd 
S6. Jd 
57. Jd 
SR. S(·c 110 ILL. CoM!'. Sri\T. <J47/67(c) (2011) (establishing sranLbrds t<>r who is 
eligible to applv l(>r the schobrship cmd who is not). 
S<J . . ~(·c Adickes v. S. H. Kn:ss & Co., 3<JR U.S. 144, 152 (1'!70) (suring tlut state 
otlicial\ involvement in a conspircKy provides state action). 
60. .~(·c Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 41 '! lJ .S. 34S, 3S2 (197 4) ("\ S [tate cKtion I can 
be 1 prcsem in the exercise bv a private emity of powers traditionallv cxclusivelv reserved to rhe 
stare"); 110 ILL. Cnvll'. STAT. 947j67(b) (2011) (outlining rhc Commission\ duties). 
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The public function theory requires that a "function performed I by a 
public entity be I exclusively and traditionally public" in order to 
impart state action.61 In K1icgcr v. Tr;wc Compa1~v, the court 
indicated that a particular board was "entrusted with what has 
traditionally been a public function: coordinating the educational 
policy and programs .... "62 The court articulated that the board W<lS 
doing more than administering over t:Kulty at a single university and 
instead was involved in the "implementation of city-wide cduotional 
policy"-a public fimction.63 
While awarding a scholarship is not a public tlmction,64 the 
DREAM fund Commission's other duties, such as "establishing and 
administering training programs f(Jr high school counselors and 
counselors, admissions otliccrs, and financial aid officers of public 
institutions of higher education," arc actions pcrf(mncd by the 
government or statc.65 While training programs can be private or 
public tlmctions, the establishing of requirements and standards f(>r 
public and government employees to participate in specific trainings 
goes beyond mere public training programs and rises to the level of 
administration within a state's educational system to become a public 
function, as in K1icgn:66 By performing these duties, the 
Commission steps into the shoes of the statc67 and the 
administr<ltion of this scholarship becomes action attributable to the 
state. 
In addition to a public function theory, the actions of the 
Commission could also be considered state action by means of the 
entanglement thcory.61l By mandating specific methods f(>r 
scholarship eligibility,69 raismg moncy,70 establishing specific 
61. Brmtwood Acad. v. Tmn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 21-lX, 302 
(2001). 
62. Sec Krieger v. Tr,mc Co., 765 F. Supp. 756, 760 (D. D.C. I<J<JI ). 
63. !d. at 761. 
64. ](,!' f(} 7lj>s fin· h/J;wciz! Aid, FASTWEB (Apr. 21, 200<J), 
http: j /www. bstweb.n lll1/fi nancial-aid/articlcs/3 54-t< >p- I 0- tips- t( >r-financial -aid. 
65. 110 ILL. COM I'. STAT. <J47/67(h) (20 II). 
66. Kn(gCJ; 765 F. Supp. at 760. 
67. Sec Bmton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (U.S. I<J61) 
(articulating how pri\·atc action imputed state action: "By its inaction, the Authoritv, and 
through it the State, has not only made itself ,l party to the rdi1sc~l of service, but h,ls 
f discriminated["). 
6X. Evans v. Newton, 3X2 U.S. 2<J6 (I <)66 ). 
6<J. I 10 III. COM!'. STAT. <J47/67(c) (201 1). 
70. ld <J47j67(b)(2). 
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programs,71 and operating methods and goals,72 the state, \Vhile 
selecting "private individuals"73 to operate the Commission,/4 
becomes entangled with the Commission such that the Commission's 
actions arc essentially those of the state, and thcrd(>rc state <KtionJ:'l 
In essence, the state is behind the scenes pulling the strings, and 
when the Commission acts and selects specific groups of people t(>r 
the schobrship,/6 it is <ls though the state is selecting them. Also, 
under an cntwinement theory, state action will be t(nmd where 
conduct that is t(>rmally "private" becomes so intertwined with 
government<ll policies or so impregnated with government character 
that the conduct becomes subject to the constitutional limitations 
placed upon state action .... In deciding the question whether state 
action existed, the court set out a three fKtor analysis: 
( 1) to what extent the business is subjected to state regulations. 
However, the court asserted that the mere bet that a business is 
subject to state regulations docs not by itself convert its actions into 
that of the state t(>r purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment; 
(2) The sufficiency of a close nexus between the state and the 
clullcngcd action of the regulatory entity, so that the action of the 
cntitv may be hirly treated as that of the state itself; 
( 3) Whether the private decision involves such coercive power or 
significant encouragement, either overt or covert, bv the state that 
thLc choice must in law be deemed that of the state. 71 
This statute presents the three necessary EKtors t(>r cntwinement: 
state regulation, a close nexus between the state and the action 
challenged, and encouragement by the state in taking action. 
In the case of the Illinois DREAM Act, the state regulates the 
DREAM fund Commission by requiring that a separate government 
organization-the Illinois Student Assistance Commission 
71. !d. 'J47/67(b)(7). 
72. !d. <)47/67. 
73. .~(·c entwinement '1rgument in proceeding paragraph. 
74. 110 III.. Cnvll'. STAT. <J47/67(a) (2011) ("The Governor shall appoint with the 
ad\·ice and consem of the Senate, members to the Illinois DREAM Fund ( :ommission."). 
7S. Sec Marsh v. Abbama, 326 U.S. :'lOI, S06 (1<)46) (illustrating how mmp'lll\' th.u 
operates town is imputed with st.lte action on its propcrtv when trying to make exclusions). 
76. Sec 110 ILL. CoM!'. STAT. <J47/67(c) (2011) (giving criteria t<>r how the 
Commission will select recipients). 
77. llawkins v. Nat'\ Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 652 F. Supp. 602,606 (C.D. Ill. I<JR7) 
(citation ,llld imenuiL]Uotation marks omitted). 
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("ISAC")-participatc in the scholarship program7X and sets specific 
guidelines on how the Commission is opcratcd?9 The nexus between 
the Commission and the state is so close that the members of the 
Commission arc chosen by the Governor of the state. xo Lastly, the 
state goes a step beyond encouragement by creating the Commission 
via statute and charging them with the duties therein. X 1 
Ultimately, the state cannot avoid state action, and thereby an 
equal protection violation, by merely substituting private actors in 
the state's place. X2 The state attempts to do this through the usc of 
two separate methods: appointing private actors to operate the 
CommissionX3 and insisting that the hmds t<>r the scholarship be 
entirely operated from private donations. X4 The Supreme Court, 
however, has stated that when a city "remains entwined in the 
management or control I of something], it remains subject to the 
restraints of the fourteenth Amcndmcnt."X5 I Icrc the State is 
maintaining control of the Commission by establishing guidelines 
within the Statutc,X6 controlling membership of the Commission,X7 
and having another state organization maintain the tlmding. xx 
Additionally, the state is appointing individuals to the Commission, 
all t()r the purpose of carrying out the discriminatory policies of the 
scholarship, satisfying the cntwincmcnt theory, and, again, making 
7X. Sec 1!0 ILL. C<Hvll'. STAT. 947j67(d) (2011) (requiring Illinois Studcm Assistance 
Commission to create a fund to provide scholarships 1(lr the Commission). 
79. Si·c 1d 947/67 (giving guidelines to the Commission f(lr required dutic.s). 
XO. .S(·c 1d 947j67(a) (charging the Illinois (;overnor with the dutv of selecting 
cc>n1n1issi< >IKrs). 
X l. fd (requiring the Illinois Studellt Assistance Commission to create the lllinoi.s 
DREAM hmd Commission). 
X2. .~(·c Evans v. Newton, 3X2 U.S. 296, 299 ( l 966) (citing Terry v. Adams 345 U.S. 
461 (I 953)) ("I W !here a State delegates an aspect of the elective process to private groups, 
thcv become subject to the same restraims as the St.ltc. That is to s.1y, when private individuals 
or groups arc endowed bv the State with powers or tlmctiom govcrnmemal in n.1tun:, thn· 
become agencies or instrumcmalities of the State and su hject to its constitutional limitatiom." 1 
(cit.ltion omitted and emphasis added). 
X3. l !0 ILL. CO/vll'. STAT. 947/67(a) (2011 ). 
X4. S(·c 1d 947/67(d) ("The Illinois DREAM fund shall he timdcd cmirch· from 
private comri hutions"). 
X5. t'1·:ms, 3X2 U.S. at 30 l. 
X6. .kc 1d 947/67. Statutes can be modified, amciKkd, or rescinded :llld therct(m· 
subject to the comrol of the legislature. 
X7. Sec 1d 947/67(a) (illustrating that the Illinois Covcrnor controls who become.s ,\ 
member of the Commission). 
XX. .Si:c id. 947j67(d) (requiring !SAC, a st.ltc org.mi£atiuii, to control the 
<:<>n1n1ission\ funding). 
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state action attributable to the Commission.X'J 
Additional control can be shown through the usc of state 
funding. Not only has the state solicited private ftmds,<JO but the 
statute's play on words to fund the scholarship with printc tlmding 
is a legislative sleight of handY 1 The statute only stipulates and 
nundatcs that the funds generating money for the scho/;u:~lnps be 
~lttaincd from private timdingY2 This allows state money and 
resources')~ to be uscd,'J4 which has already occurred, in the 
furtherance of this discriminatory scholarship.% Despite the state's 
attempt to circumvent state action through the usc of private funds,% 
public tlmds arc being uscd,'J7 and, again, through a theory of 
cntwincmcnt, st~ltc action can be f(mnd, requiring application of an 
equal protection analysisYX 
State action must be t(mnd in the application of the Illinois 
DREAM Act; to not do so would allow the state to carry out 
discriminatory ~1gcncbs, dtcctivdy destroying equal protcction99 and 
allowing legislative bodies to enact discrimin~ltory statutes and 
WJ. Sec F1 ;~m, ~X2 U.S. at ~()I (tramtl-rring of p.1rk to pri\'.lte trustee did not JTmm·e 
sute action). 
90. .~(·c 1/!J/un; !>RtAA1 !let, [III:-.JOIS STUDE:-.JT ASSISTA;o.;CF OJ:\11-.!ISSIO;o.; (2012), 
http:/ jwww .collcgcillinois.c>rg/illinc>is-dream-actjindcx.html (shc>wing that lllin<>is' rcsoun:cs 
and monev arc being utilized hv having the Covcrnor and state involved, milizing the validitv 
of the st.ltc\ reputation l(H· a purely private scholarship, and using statc-timdcd and -operated 
wchsitcs l(>r :ldvcrtising .md soliciting l(>r Commission members, donations, and the 
progr.1n1.). 
91. S(:c l 10 11.1 .. COM!'. SlAT. 947/67(d) (2011) ("The.. Fund shall he timdcd 
cntirclv from priv.nc contributions"). 
92. .~(·c id. (requiring that a fund he established to provide scho/.u:;hips and th:lt the 
fund he mtirclv ti·om priv:ltc contributions, thcrd(>tT requiring that onlv the scholarship 
monev he privarclv funded). 
9~ . . ~(·c id. 947j67(h)(2) (noting that the statlltc\ cst.Jblishment of:\ not-l(>r-protit 
entirv to raise tlmd.s t(>r the :ldministr:ltion of the section makes 110 rdi.:rencc to those timds 
being private nor limits its timding to a private source). 
<J4. .~(·c 1d. 947j67(a) (requiring !SAC to set up:\ fund t(>r the Commission). 
<JS. Sec Appm/mncnt;·, STATF 01' III.I;o.;OIS, 
http:/ /appointments.illinois.govj:lppointmentsDct:lil.din?id=4 I 7 (last visited Oct. X, 20 II) 
(showing that Illinois' resources and money have been used to ti~rther the progr.1m hv hosting 
.1pplications on the state\ servers, pav l(H· someone to publish the posting, and maintain the 
wehpage). 
%. 110 11.1 .. CoM!'. STAT. 947/67(d) (201 I). 
97. Appointment;, supr:1note <JS. 
9X . . kc Ev:1ns \'.Newton, 3X2 U.S. 296, ~02 (1966) (amlogizing the tr.mskr of the 
park in FJ',Jfls to the transkr of the program and scholarship to the Commission). 
99. .~(·c Recent lkvdopmems, supr:Jnote 2S (staring that st:1tc .1etion is required t<>r :111 
e<jll.ll protection :malv.sis). 
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policies by means of third parties to circumvent ~md avoid the st~ltc 
action requirement f()r equal protection analysis.IOO The state's 
establishment of discriminatory guidelines and selection of trustees to 
act on its behalf in applying these guidclincsiOI arc the reasons why 
the courts have articulated the theories of cntanglemcnt1 02 and 
cntwincmcnt103 and whv state action should be f(mnd. 
Whether state action is f()Und from the Bill's codification or 
under an alternative theory, sutlicicnt state action exists to give rise to 
an equal protection analysis. The state's role as puppet-master in the 
manipulation of this act mandates the application of the federal 
Constihltion to overcome this injustice. Accordingly, the fourteenth 
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause applies. 
B. Method o{Discnininztion 
Continuing with the equal protection analysis, after state action 
has been met, the application or method that creates the 
discriminatory policy must be addrcsscd. 1 04 Here the statute bcially 
creates the classification advancing the equal protection analysis. 1 os 
However, if the statute were f(mnd to be t:Kially neutral, it would 
still be discriminatory in its effect because of its intent and results. 
A classification is deemed to be bcially discriminatory when the 
discrimination can be t(nmd in the plain language of the statutc. 106 
In the Act bctc)rc us, one of the requirements is that a recipient must 
"have at least one parent who immigrated to the U nitcd States." I 07 
The groups created arc a class of children who have one parent that 
immigrated to the United States and a class of children whose 
parents did not immigrate to the U nitcd States, I Oil thus creating the 
100. !d. 
101. 5ix 110 !1.1 .. O>MI'. STAT. <J47/67(a) (2011) (authorizing a stare actor, the 
GmTrnor, ro selLer rhe commissioners, who, in turn, select the scholarship recipients). 
I 02. Fvans, 3H2 U.S. 2<J6. 
I 03. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 2HX (200 I). 
I 04. Miller v. johnson, 5 I 5 U.S. <JOO, <JOS (I <J<JS) (illustrating that eqtul protection 
applies to laws that arc both t:Kiallv discriminatory and bcially ncutrctl with discriminator\' 
impact). 
105. Sec l'lessv v. ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 53H (IX<J6), overruled lw Brown\'. Bd. of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 4X3 (I <)54) (stating that a law me1king it illegal ti>r people to not sit in se.tts 
other tlun those assigned to them based on their race is bcially discriminCJtorv). 
I 06. !d. 
107. 110 ILL. CO,Yll'. STAr. 'J47j67(c)(3) (2011 ). 
I OX. !d. 
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classification in the bnguagc of the Bill. Therefore, the statute will be 
deemed bcially discriminatory t<>r purposes of an equal protection 
analvsis. 1 09 
Should a f:1eially discriminatory argument be unsuccessful and the 
statute t(nmd bcially neutral, the equal protection analysis is still 
proper under a discriminatory application thcory.ll o The 
Commission is required by law to select individuals t<>r scholarships 
based on the given criteri~1 of the statute. Ill By carrying out its 
duties, the Commission will only be able to award the scholarship to 
those who have at least one parent that immigrated to the United 
States. 112 This would have the same dlcct and outcome as the f1eiallv 
discrimin~ltory argument, again, advancing the equal protection 
an~1lvsis. 11 -' 
In the event that neither of these theories is succcsstlli, a third 
theory exists where the statute is bcially neutral and neutrally applied 
but produces discriminatory results coupled with a discrimin~1tory 
intcnt.ll4 Proving this theory requires the same scenario used under 
the previous theory, in which there arc discriminatory results t(>r the 
recipients of the scholarship, but not because of the selection process. 
If these results occur, looking at the legislative debate bd(>rc the Act 
was passed can satisfy the discriminatory intent prong. 11 S Senator 
Culkrton, who sponsored ~md submitted the bill, 116 indicated that 
the intent of the Bill was to make available to non-citizcn individuals 
"the same programs that the citizens can avail themselves of right 
nmv,"ll7 suggesting that the t(>Cus of this Bill was to aid non-citizcn 
individuals. Additionally, Senator Johnson emphasized the purpose 
of the Bill as being for "childrcn of immigr~mts who came here 
109. .~(·c 1d 947/67(c) (creating other classifications; however, f(>r the purposes of this 
Note, Subsection (c)(4) is the relevant dassitiution). 
ll 0. ;'v/Illo; S l S U.S. 900. 
Ill. llO ILL. C:OMI'. STilT. 947/67(c)(3) (2011). 
112. /d (requiring the Commission to t(,llow the guidelines in the statute). 
113. Afi!!CJ; 51 S U.S. 900. 
114. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 ( 1976). 
liS. Marrin ). O'Hara, Is IrA Chine to rive in PuNic !lousing? !l l'ropm.II to the 
/1/inoi;· Gcncr;I/ Asscmhh· to Amend the Autonutic Tumkr St.Itutc, 27 j. MARS I L\l.L L. RE\'. 
XSS, X76 ( l 994 ). 
116. S. 2lXS, 97th (;en. Assemb. (IlL 2011 ), ,li;Iif,Ihk ;It 
http://www.ilga.gov/lcgisbtion/Bi!IStatus.asp?DocNum= 21 XS&c;AJI)= II &D<>cTvpell )= SB 
&Scssion1D=X4&C;A=97 (noting that Senator C:ullerton sponsored the Bill) 
117. S. liLOOR DFB/\TF, 97th IlL (;en. Assemb., (;en. Scss. 23 (Mc1y 4, 20 I I). 
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probably not by their own choice, but because . . . of their 
parcnts." 1 IH This furthers the non-citizen contention, 119 emphasizing 
the intent of the Bill to be f(x children of immigr~mts and not non-
immigrants.120 Senator Delgado also indicated that the fcxus of the 
Bill was to specifically aid those that "don't enjoy the ... status of 
citizcnship."121 While Senator Delgado did not emphasize the 
children-of-immigrants aspect, he still stressed a discriminatory intent 
fc:>r the Bill to apply to either non-citizens or children of immigrants 
and not others. The discussions during the floor debate did not argue 
against this framework and instead consisted of verbal support f(x 
the Bill. 122 While senators may vote on a bill f(x ditlcrcnt reasons, 
the unifcxmity of the comments that arose and the lack of 
contradiction indicate that distinguishing between immigrants and 
non-immigrants was at least one view of the Bill's intended 
purpose.I23 
C Classifications Created 
Under an equal protection analysis, the classification used by the 
state determines what test should be applied in order to determine if 
the classification is constitutional or unconstitutionaJ.124 Courts must 
look at the impact of a statute, as well as the wording of the statute 
itself~ in identifying along what lines classifications arc being 
drawn. 125 This particular Act creates classifications based on 
alicnagc126 or, alternatively, national origin.127 
11H. !d. 
119. !d. 
120. ld at 26. 
121. !d. clt 2H. 
122. Sec H.R. f.:LOOR DEBATE, 97th Ill. (;en. Assemb., Gm. Se,s. 17'J (Mav 30, 2011) 
(emphasizing that the Illinois House of Representative' comments mirrored those of the 
Senate through the House sponsor Representative Acevedo's response to "[ (:[an anv student 
applv t(H· this . scholarship?" being "[ U [ndocumented, yes," as well a.s Representative 
Mulligan's statement regarding immigrants: "it would be to educate the be't and tl1<: brightest 
to go on, particularh· to help their hmilies and mavbc be the first person that\ gone to 
college ... "). 
123. Sec 1d (noting that no one spoke in opposition to the Bill). 
124. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972) ("[T[hc Court has c\·olved more 
th,m one test, depending upon the interest aHccted or the classification involved"). 
125. Sec Mcm'l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty, 415 U.S. 250, 254 (1974) ("In determining 
whether the challenged ... provision violates the Equal Protection CLHhC, we must fir.st 
determine what burden of justific1tion the cbssitiution created"). 
126. I 10 ILL. COM!'. STAT. 947/67(c) (201 I) (I(>Cusing on the citizcnship implications 
associcltcd with the statute\ usc of the word immigrants). 
lj TH I<~ ILLINOIS DREAM ACT 189 
1. Alienage 
The way the statute is phrased, stating that that the scholarship is 
eligible for people who have a "parent who immigrated to the United 
States," 12 ~'~ draws a divide based on alienage.I2<J Black's Lnv 
Dictionary defines alietuge as "the condition or state of an alien ""'0 
~md an alien as "a foreigner; one born abroad; a person resident in 
one country, but owing allegiance to another." 1-' 1 Additionally, 
federal legislation has articulated a statutory ddinition of an alien as 
'\1ny person not a citizen or national of the United St~ltes." I -'2 These 
ddinitions articulate the characteristics necessary fiJr a classification 
b~1sed on alienage. for this Act, the parent of the individual must 
have been an ~1lien (someone born abroad) who came to the United 
States'-'-' in order for the individual to be eligible to receive the 
scholarship.I34 
Looking at the floor debates results in the same interpretation f(x 
the purposes of articulating the basis of the classification as being 
grounded along alienage lines. Throughout the tloor debates, in both 
the Illinois House of Representatives and the Illinois Senate, it w~ls 
repeated and emphasized that the Act was going to aid the children 
of illegal immigr~mts and to give undocumented children a chance to 
further their educations by making funding available to allow them 
to attend higher education bcilities. 135 These expressions indicate 
that the intention of the Act is to create a classification between 
citizens and non-citizens or, put into the equ~1l protection fr~m1ework, 
a classification based on alienagc.I36 
127. !d. (requiring parents' immigration creates anation:ll origin requirement). 
121-1. !d. 
12<J. !d. 
130. A/im:l!{<" /)cfinitJ(}/], BJ.M K'S LAW DICTIO:O:AKY, 
http://bbcksl.nnliction:m·.or)!;/alim:lge/ (last \'is ired Nov. 24, 20 II). 
131. A lim f)cfinition, BLACK'S L\ W DICT!Ol'\i\K Y, http://bbcksl:nvdiction:lr\'.or)!;/alicn-
n/ (l:tst \'isin:d Nov. 24, 2011). 
132 SecK U.S.C. § 1101 (2011). 
133 110 II.!.. Cn\11'. ST,\T. <J47/67(c)(4) (2011 ). 
134. !d. <J47/67(c). 
135. .~(·c H.R. t:J.OOK DE!li\TE, sup1:1notc 122. 
136. SiT Espinm:l v. F:lrah Mtg. Co., 414 U.S. X6 ( l<J73) (st.lting that cbssitic:ltions 
b:1sed on citizenship arc discriminations based on alienage), Sllf'<'J:I'C<kd lw st.ltlltc on other 
p.row1<l1 :1.1 .lt.ltu! in ( :orrcz:ulo v. S.liin Bank & Trust Co., 6XO t-:.3d <J36 (7th ( :ir. 20 II). 
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While the statute docs not explicitly state that the dividing lines 
arc based on alienage, this is not a rcquircment. 137 If that were the 
case, legislative and government bodies could avoid fourteenth 
Amendment scrutiny by not using wording that directly identifies 
one of the classifications.13X This statute's classification is based on a 
parent's alienage, rather than the alienage of the actual recipient, but 
this distinction is immatcriaJ. 139 The statute on its f:Ke is classif)·ing 
someone based on the recipient's parent's classification and this 
generational removal is still a classification based on alicnage.140 
Classifications based on alienage arc typically subject to a strict 
scrutiny analysis.14l Exceptions exist that have allowed for a less strict 
analysis when alienage is a relevant trait.142 The courts have 
articulated that when dealing with an interest in the dcmocr<ltic 
process, such as voting, 143 clections, 144 certain public otliccs, 14S 
police oHiccrs, 146 and primary or secondary education teaching 
positions, 147 one's citizenship stahls aHccts one's ability to carry out 
those roles and thus becomes rclcvant. 14X The Illinois DREAM Act, 
however, is not atlcctcd by such an applie<ltion of the classification 
because receiving a scholarship is not "intimately related to the 
137. S(·c Lewis v. Ascension ]',1rish Sch. Bd., 662 F.3d 343, 3S3 (Sth Cir. 2011) (Jones, 
]., concurring) ("What matters is the government\ inrcntionalusc ofraei<ll classification"). 
13X. Sec Scmlc Sch. Dist. No. I v·. Washington, 633 F.2d 133X, 1344 (9th Cir. I 9XO) 
("Though Initiative 350 creates the differential classification indirectly hv omission, there is no 
basis f(lr distinguishing it as a matter of law from ... explicit 
classiticatiom "). 
139 .. S{·cSt. Francis Cull. v. AI-Khazraji, 4XI U.S. 604,613 (19X7) ("Congre." intended 
to protect ti·om discrimin,ltion identifiable cbsses of persons who arc subject to intentional 
discrimination solch· because of their ancestry"). 
140. .kc l'lcssv v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 ( IX<J6) (indicating that a law during the 
scp<lratc hut equal era applied to an individual who was one-eighth black, much like thi.s law, 
which grants schobrship cligihilitv as lung as an indiv·idml is at least a qu.lrter-immigr.mt). 
141. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 2 I') (I 9X4) ("[A [ sutc law tlut discriminates on 
rhc b.1sis of .dimage can be sustained only if it can withstand strict judicial scrutinv."J. 
I42. !d. at 224 (recognizing citizenship status as being a bctor t(H· democratic sclt~ 
gov·crnmcnt roles .md »ituations). 
143. Id (timctioning that is deemed political not held to strict scrutinv). 
144. !d. (t(lllowing that electable positions would also flll into this categorY). 
14S. Id (im·olving those with the "dav-to-d.1y timctioning of »tate government" but not 
nourics). 
146. Foln· v. Conndic, 43S U.S. 29 I ( 197X ). 
147. (;regorv A. Scopino, A C()f)stitutionJ! Oddin· oF Almost HJ';C<IIIt!i1<· 0Jmplnin': 
An:z/1 ';CJi1g the f:!ficimcr· oF the !'olitiul Function Doctrine, ')() CORNELl. L. REV. I 377, 1379 
( 200S) (listing teachers omd scvcr;ll other l''"itions as .1lso blling within this exception). 
14X. Bernal v·. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 2 I') (I 9X4 ). 
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process of democratic self-govcrnmcnt."l4° 
furthermore, alienage classifications preventing aliens from 
receiving in-state tuition luvc bcm struck down in the past. ISO While 
the Supreme Court has stated that "undocumented aliens" arc not 
themselves a suspect classification, 1 S 1 the wording of the Act allows 
t(>r documented and undocumented aliens to receive this 
scholarship, 152 thus preventing that tl·om affecting the classifiotion 
or which test to apply. 
2. Nationzl origin 
In the alternative, the Act also classifies applicants along lines of 
national origin. N a tiona) origin classifications, instead of t<xusing on 
citizenship status like alimagc, 153 f(Kus on "the country from which 
you or your f(>rcbc~lrs came. "1 54 Classifications "I distinguishing I 
between citizens solely because of their ancestry I is I odious to a free 
people whose institutions arc t(mndcd upon the doctrine of 
equality, "1 ss and the Act classifies directly along those lines. 
The Illinois DREAM Act's language requiring tlut ~m individual 
"have a parent who immigrated to the United Statcs"l56 expressly 
inquires into one's ancestry to determine if one meets this 
requirement ~md is therd(HT eligible f(>r this scholarship.lS7 This type 
of inquiry and classification of individuals "implicates the s~m1C grave 
concerns as a classification specifying a particular race by name. "ISS 
140. .~l.·c id. ,\t 216 ("iTihe standard of review is lowered when evaluating the validirv of 
exclusions that entrust only to citizens important elective and non-elective positions whose 
operations go to the heart of representative government."). 
ISO. Toll v. Moreno, 4SX U.S. 1, 010 (10X2) (striking down the discrimineltorv policv 
belsed on the Supremacy Clause and not the Equal Protection Clause). 
151. Ph·lcr \'. Doc, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (I 0S2 ). 
152. Sec 110 11.1 .. C:OMI'. STAT. 047/67(c) (2011) (allowing an illegal alim with ell\ 
immigram parent to be eligible ti>r the scholarship ,llso allows a United Sutcs-born child with 
ell\ immigram parent to be eligible ti>r the scholarship). 
153. Sec Espinoza v. 1-'arah Mtg. Co., 414 U.S. S6 (1073) (stelting that classifications 
based on citizenship arc discriminations based on alienage), supcJ:1nlcd lw sr;~turc on orhcr 
!'mund1 as sr;~rcd 1i1 ( :orrczano v. S,llin Bank & Trust ( :o., 6SO !-'.3d 036 (7th Cir. 2011 ). 
154. !d. at S0 (quoting the definition of national origin). 
155. Regents ofUniv. ofC1lif v. Bakke, 43X U.S. 265,204 (1078) (quoting l.m·ing v. 
Virginia, 3SS U.S. I (1067)). 
156. 110 !1.1.. COMI'. STAT. 047/67(c)(4) (2011 ). 
157. !d 
1 SX. Rice v. C1yctano, 52X U.S. 405, 406 (2000) (discussing ancestry as a classification 
relevant to the fourteenth Amendment, although decided on 1-'itin:mh Amcndmellt grounds). 
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This has the effect of using the national origin of one's parents to 
determine one's eligibility. If both parents' national origin is that of 
the United States, the individual is not eligible f(Jr the scholarship. 15<J 
An unpublished federal case from the District Court of New 
Jersey addressed the national origin relationship by stating that the 
national origin of an individual "born in the United States is 
determined by looking only to his anccstry." 160 This articulation 
dispels the possibility of the state contending that the Act is not a 
national origin case by arguing that the Act docs not address the 
individual's national origin, but instead f(>euscs on parcntagc.I 6 1 
Even if such an argument is accepted, the parentage here only applies 
because the applicant is looking to his parent's national origin; it 
docs not f(>eus on his relationship to his parcnts.I62 This creates a 
chain where, even if the classification is drawn along parentage lines, 
the ultimate classification still rests on the national origin roots of the 
parents. To allow the state to overcome a national ongm 
classitlcation by simply removing the classification by a matter of 
generations, or degree of separation, would permit classifications 
based on one's race to be enf()rccablc as long as states phrase 
legislation to depend on one's past generations, 163 which again, the 
courts have not allowed. 1M 
The most important case in establishing an equal protection 
analysis f()r a classification based on national origin is Korcmatm v. 
United Statcs. 165 In Korcmatm, a curfew-relocation order was 
enacted t()r people of Japanese ancestry, barring them from leaving 
their houses during certain hours, much as the Illinois DREAM Act 
is a scholarship-eligibility bar against those whose ancestry docs not 
IS<J. 110 [!.I.. OlMI'. STXI'. <J47/67(c)(4) (2011) (requiring a parent to have immigrated 
to the United States). 
160. Sec English v. Misvs lnt'l Banking Svs., Inc., 2005 WL 17031 <J<J, at *6 ( D.N .J. J ulv 
20, 2005 ). 
161. 110 l!.L. COM!'. STAT. <J47/67(c) (2011) (hypothetically arguing th.lt the plain 
languc1ge revolves around a pclrental relationship). 
162. Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. S3 (200 I) (discussing 
pan:ntage as the t(mll of the relationship to the parent, the issue in this case being cliphilitv f(Jr 
citi1xnship status because the Lither wc1s cl U.S. citizen). 
163. .~<·e Christine B. Hickman, The nenl and the One J)rop Rule: Rau;zJ Cmgon(·s, 
Afi-icznilmericws, :If}(! the U.S. Cemus, <J5 MJ(:JI. L. RFV. 1161, 117H (l<J<J7) (discussing the 
implications of defining blacks in certain parts of the United States as "anvone who was one· 
sixtemth Black" and being subject to discrimincltion). 
164. Rice v. Cayetano, 52K U.S. 4<J5, 4<J6 (2000). 
16S. Korematsu v. United States, 323U.S. 214 (l<J44). 
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go outside the borders of the United Statcs.166 Ironically, 
Korcmatsu, who was subject to internment because of his parent's 
national origin, 167 would be eligible f()r a scholarship under the Act, 
but his children would not. 16X This type of discriminatory 
classification-classification based on the national origin of one's 
lxlrcnts-is subJ.CCt to "the most ri<rid scrutinv "169 t-cc1uiring the b .i ') L 
applicuion of strict scrutiny.170 
D. Strict ScrutJi~l' Appjjcation 
The next step in the equal protection analysis is to determine 
what level of scrutiny to apply: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, 
or rational basis review. Given the varying ditlicultics of the 
government in overcoming the analysis, the level of scrutiny is 
crucial, with strict scrutiny being the toughcst.171 While an Equal 
Protection Clause claim can be brought under either classification 
pursuant to this analysis-alienage or national origin-the 
appropriate test is the same regardless. I 72 The Supreme Court in the 
Ci(l' o{ Clcbumc, Tex;Is v. Cleburne Living Center grouped 
classifications based on race, alienage, and national origin together 
because 
It I hcsc f:Ktors arc so seldom relevant to the achievement of any 
legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations arc 
deemed to rdkct prejudice and antipathy-a view that those in the 
burdened class arc not as worthy or deserving as others. For these 
reasons and because such discrimination is unlikclv to be soon 
166. !d. .lt 2 I 7. 
167. WF:--JDY S. WILS0:--1 & (;FRALll H. HEIC'v!At\, CRITIC\! Tlllt\KINlo l!SINl; 
I'RIMi\RY SoURCES 1:--1 U.S. HISTORY HO (2000). Korenutsu was born in the United States, 
hut his parents immigrated to the United Stcrtcs ti·om Japan. !d. His witC Katlwrn Korcmatsu 
was born in South C1rolina. SA:\ LEANDRO MA YORi\L !'ROU .i\i'v!ATION: KATIIR Y:--1 
KoREMi\TSU DAY (Mar. I 4, 20 I 2 ), :w.ubhlc :zt 
http:/ fwww .san lea nd n > .< >rg/dcpts/ cityha11/cc nmci 1/ comnKndati< ms _proclanuti< ms _and_ ceremo 
nicll_tTsolutions.asp (illustrolting that even if the Koremcltsu's child met the other requirements, 
she would still be ineligible ti>r the scholarship because neither of her parents arc immigrants). 
16H. I 10 ILL. COM I'. STAT.'>47/67(c) (201 I) (requiring recipients to luvc .l\l immigrclllt 
pcHTnt). 
16'>. Koremarw, 323 U.S. at 216. 
170. ld 
I 71 . c;crald ( ;unthcr, 1l1e Supreme Court, I 'J7! Term-Foreword: In Sc:mh oF 
F1·o!t·in!{ /)ocrn/Je on :z ChzngtiJg Cf111rt: A ,Hodel fiw :1 Newer f:(ju:zf!'mtcction, H6 I IAR \'. I .. 
RF\'. I, H ( 1'>72) (stating that strict scrutiny is "strict in thcorv and btal in fKt"). 
172. Citv of Cleburne, Tex. \'. Clcbttmc Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (I <JH5 ). 
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rectified by legislative means, these laws arc subject to strict 
scrutiny ... _173 
As such, strict scrutiny requires a compelling government interest 
f(:>r the classification, and the implementation of the classification 
must be narrowly tailored to meet th~lt intcrcst.I74 
Aside from the justification of the view set f(xth in the Ci~v oF 
Cleburne, Texas, the Court has stated that alienage, race, and 
national origin should further be protected because, in addition to 
not being reflective of their "ability to contribute to socicty," 17S these 
classifications arc "characteristic! s I determined by causes not within 
the control of the 1 individual! .... "!76 furthermore, the 
Constitution will not allow these classifications, either, which is why 
the Act must be struck down under equal protection f(>r punishing 
children based on characteristics of their parcnts. 177 
While this statute may appear to be "beneficial" discrimination by 
aiding minorities, the Supreme Court has already addressed this 
theory.' n Ultimately it has been decided that 
It !he Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not only 
because those classifications can harm hvorcd races or arc based on 
illegitimate motives, but also because every time the government 
places citizens on racial registers and makes race rclev~1nt to the 
provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us <111. 179 
Therd()re, strict scrutiny applies regardless of how beneficial this 
discriminatory statute is considcrcd.l80 The Courts have, however, 
recently articulated that the majority party would not pass legislation 
to their own detriment unless they deemed it satisf:Ktory. 181 This 
173. !d. 
174. !d. 
17S. .~(:c Mathews v. Luus, 427 U.S. 495, 505 ( 1976 ). 
176. ld 
177. .kc Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 ( 1988) ("/ W Je lu\T im·.1lidated cl.lssitiutions 
that burden illegitimate children f(lr the sake of punishing the illicit relations of their parents"). 
178. Regents of Univ. of (:ali f. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 270 ( 1978) (stating that strict 
scrutiny applied even if the discrimination was being used to aid minorities). 
179. Sec Parents Involved in Cmrv. Schs. v. Se.lttlc Sch. J)ist. No. I, 551 U.S. 701, 7S2 
(2007) (pointing out that discrimination, even if bendicial to one race, burdens another) . . ~(·c 
.lim W\·gant \'. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 ( 1986) ("The Court has recognized tlut 
the level of scrutiny does not change merely beuuse the challenged classitiution operates 
against a group that historically Ius not been subject to governmcnul discrimination."). 
I 80. l'armt' !ni'OI!nf, SS I U.S. at 752 (2007). 
181. John Hart Elv, The Constitlltionalin·oFR.cvcJ:\·c R.aci;i/ J)i,crimination, 41 U. CIII. 
. Rn·. 723, 73S (1974). 
lj THE ILLINOIS DREAM ACT 195 
argument bils to take into consideration other reasons that may exist 
f(>r passing legislation, such as pandering to certain groups f(>r 
votcs. 1 ~ 2 While strict scrutiny has been rdcrrcd to as "strict in thcorv, 
but htal in hct,"i~3 an ,111:1lysis of the test must still be done to 
determine if the state has a compelling interest that is narrowh· 
tailorcd. 1 ~'4 
1. Compci!Iizg IiltLTcst 
The state docs not have a compelling interest in establishing the 
DREAM schobrship program b,1scd on a suspect classification. The 
otlcrcd intent of the act is to "help I the applicants' I f1milics and 
maybe be the first person that's gone to colkgc."IX5 few compelling 
interests exist to justif)r legislation that utilizes suspect 
classifications.' X6 That said, courts have recognized compelling 
interests in the past: I ~' 7 first, to remedy past discrimination lXX and 
second, to provide a diversity of perspectives within cducation. 1X0 
Unf(>rtunatdy, neither of these interests is prcscnt within this Act. 
While this statute creates a scholarship f(>r students to aid them in 
funding their education, ' 00 merely being related to education docs 
not make the Act sufficient to meet the compelling interest of 
diversity of perspectives in education t(mnd in Cruttcr v. 
Ho!!Iizgcr.I 01 Gruttcr addressed a university's practice of considering 
<111 applicant's race in admissions as one t:Ktor to encourage diversity 
I X2. !d (illustrating other reasons t(Jr p.lssing this tvpc of legislation, such as garnering 
support ti·om a particular segment of the population). 
IX3. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pcna, SIS U.S. 200, 275 (1<)<)5) (Ginsburg, J., 
di~scnting). 
1~4. S(·c Grnrtcr v. Bollinger, 53<) U.S . .306 (200.3) (overcoming a strict scrutinv 
.lluh·sis). 
IXS . . ~(·c II.R. 0060, <)3d Gen. Asscmb. lXI (Ill. 200.3), ;w;u/ahlc ;Jr 
http: I /www. i I g;l. g< lV /kgislatioll/bi llstatus,;lsp? n, JCN lll11 = 
0060&(;1\J I )=3&GA=03& I )ocTvpcJJ)= J-IB&I.cgll )=I %&Session II )=3&SpecScss=. 
I X6. AdJr;md C'onsrrucron, 51 S U.S. at 27S (emphasizing th.lt strict scrlltinv is "btal" in 
bet bccmsc it is supposed to weed out kgitimatl' uses ti·om illegitimate uses whm Elced wirh a 
suspect classiticnion). 
I X7. !d. 
!XX . . ~(·c Local 2X of Sheet Metal Workers' lnt'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 47X U.S. 421, 47<) 
(I <)X(J J (;lHirming the usc of ;l remedy tilt· p;lst discrimi1ution as a valid interest). 
I X0. Ad1ond Crmsrrucron, 515 U.S. 200. 
]00. 110 ILL. COM!'. STSI. <)47/67(c) (2011 ). 
101. (;ruttcr v. Bolling<'r, 53<) U.S. 306, 32X (2003) (indicating; tlut policies will still be 
scrutinized l'\Tn though thev ;llldress educatio11.ll bendirs). 
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in its law schooi. 1lJ2 Unlike GruttcJ~ this Act docs not ~1ssurc diversity 
in an educational institution. The applicants could go to a school that 
is already diverse or not provide diversity at all, as eligibility is based 
on the parents' and not the applicant's status. furthermore, ~1nd 
most importantly, "race and national origin I can be considered I, 
but . . . cannot I be used to I . . . render a judgment solely on that 
basis," as is the case here, leaving the Act without a compelling 
intercst.193 
Aside from diversity at an educational instih1tion, the Court has 
f(mnd programs that rectify past discrimination against suspect 
classes to be a compelling interest. 194 Illinois State Representative 
Eddie Acevedo stated, "This is going to be a ftmd that's going to be 
available not only to undocumented immigrants but to all 
immigrants here in Illinois." 195 However, there is no evidence that 
this segment of the population has been discriminated against in 
tlmding. 196 In f:1ct, some of the senators and representatives 
themselves may potentially be eligible f(>r the scholarship, having 
immigrant parents. 197 Thercf(>re, a scenario of discrimination against 
immigrant populations must have existed in Illinois in order to pass 
legislation to remedy that past discrimination.19X 
192. !d..lt 339. 
193. Nc!hlw, , .. Ridge, 2003 WL 22X49146, Jt *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. I, 2003). 
194. Local 2X of Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 47X U.S. 421, 479 (I 9X6 J. 
I 95. Clurlcs Thomas, Quinn 5/"gns 1/!Jiu>il Urc;~m Acr, ABC 7 NFWS (Aug. I, 20 II), 
http:/ jabclocal.go.com/wls/storv1section = news/lool& id = X2X I X2 7. 
196. Sec H.R. 0060, 93d Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2003 ), ;11",/1/;zh/c H 
http:/ jwww. ilga.g<>\'/lcgislation/hillstattls.asp? D<>eN 11111 =0060&GAI I)= 3&GA =93& I )<>cTvpe 
ID=HB&Leg!D= I 95&Session!D=3&SpecScss= (granting in-state tuition to non-citizcm. if 
they "graduated ti-om a high 'chool in I Illinois 1. among other conditions.") . . ~(·c ;~/m Chi. Pub. 
Sch,. Coil. & Career Preparation, Undocumented Swdcnt1, Section 7- Sdw!:znhip1 fi>r 
Undowmmtcd Swdcnt1; CHOOSE YOUR HJTURE, 
iltt[l :/ /W\\'W .ell<" >Sev<Hirtilture. org/c<>llcge/UIKi<KtlmCilted-sttldcllt' #sch< >Iarsh i 11 ( lclst vi.sited 
Ike. 25, 2012) (indicating rhat "It !here Jre I alreJdv I scholarships avJilablc till· undocumented 
students through private organizations," as well as scholarships that do not usc immigr.lnt 
statm as criteria ti>r eligibility). 
197. .kc S. l'LOOR DEBATE, supt;z note 117, at 26 (quoting Senator T. )ohm.on stating 
thc1t "the children of 111\' grandparents had no choice hut to come with their parents to this 
countrv," indicating that his parents immigrated to the United States, and, thcrdiHT, if he mer 
the other recjuiremcnts, he would be eligible l(,r the DREAM 'cholarship). 
19X. Sec Fou/28, 47X U.S. 421. 
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Additionally, while the Court in I<orcmatsu did find th~lt a 
compelling interest existed in detaining those with Japanese ancestry, 
the interest was predicated on the bet that the United States was at 
war with Japan, 1 <J<J and there arc presently no wars against 
immigrants to justif~· such a classification.200 ~urthcrmorc, Congress 
decided that "the decision in Korcmatm lies overruled in the court of 
history,"201 significantly limiting the weight a compelling interest 
stemming from I<orcmatm could be given. 
2. Narrowk tailored 
The Supreme Court requires that suspect cbssifications with a 
compelling interest must be narrowly tailored in order to limit the 
effects of the discrimination. 202 Thcrd(:n-e, even should a compelling 
state interest be f(nmd in the case of the Illinois DREAM Act, the 
statute as written is not n~1rrowly tailored to meet such an interest. If 
the interest is grounded in making education more avaibble to 
citizens who would otherwise be unable to attend college, it f1ils to 
do so in a narrowly tailored manner, as the statute's wording allows 
individuals who sutter no financial hardships or burdens to apply f(>r 
the schobrship. 2m Allowing wealthy students or those with college 
expenses paid through other means to take advantage of the 
schobrship may deprive those whose only prohibition is cost of a 
scholarship opportunity. 204 ~urthermorc, economic h~1rdships do 
not distinguish based on national origin, race, or alienage. These 
hardships atHict all segments of the population, and if the state's 
interest W~lS to make education more aft(n·dabJc to its citizens, non-
financial-based classifications curtail that goal.205 Instead, the Act is 
I<J<J. Korcnutsu v. Unitl'd Statl's, 323li.S. 214 (I<J44). 
200 .~(·c td (dl'cickd as a compl'lling intnl'st because till' Unitl'd St.ltl'S \L\S at w,lr with 
).1pan ,md )apanl'se individtul' werl' trl'atnl ditrcrl'ntlv. Thi' cbssitic1tion, hown-cr, dol's not 
trl',lt ditkrl'ntlv Iraqis or anv othn group with which thl' Unitl'd Statl's is ,\t war; f(>r a 
compelling intl'ITst to exist in this ca,e, thl' Unitl'd Sratl's would have to be involved in a war 
on immigration). 
20 l. S. Res. 126, I 09th Con g., 151 CoNci. RH. 7954 (Apr. 21, 2005 ). 
202. .~(·c Wvg.mt v. ),lckson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 265, 2lB ( I<JX6) (stating that a 
narrowlv tailored tit needs to bl' "less intrusive"). 
203. 110 II.!.. COM!'. STAT. 947/67 (2011) (noting no financial hardship requirements). 
204. !d. (assuming a 'ceiurio whne because tinanci,ll lurdship is not ,\ll inquirv, ,\ll 
indiv·idtul tliilv capable of paying f(Jr college receive» the schobrship o\'l'r someone who em not 
aH<>rd college). 
20S. Sec The Henrv ). Kaiser Familv Found., !'twcm· Rate lw R.Iu/Fthnicin·, St:Itc.1 
( ](}(Jl).2(} I 0), U.S. ( 20 I 0}, ST.\ IT.H l·o\I.TIIFM TS.ORli, 
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tailored t()r immigrants and gives no attention to making higher 
education more available to the economically deprived-immigrant 
or not. 206 
At the same time, the Act is also overly broad, providing 
superfluous assistance to some individuals ~1nd not others who arc 
similarly situatcd.207 Prior to the statute, the state already had 
financial aid assistance programs in place t()r citizens, as well as 
reduced tuition rates at public universities to make college more 
aft(H·dable.20X following the public act creating this statute, those 
same assistance programs were made available to immigrant students 
who tiled t()r a taxpayer identification numbcr.20'> By allowing 
everyone within the state regardless of alienage or national origin 
access to the same financial assistance t()r higher education, the state 
was not and is not creating any classification. It is the portion of the 
Act mandating that a scholarship be payable to certain individuals 
distinguishable on the basis of national origin and alienage that 
creates the problem. Thus, opening tlmding puts everyone on equal 
f()oting, rendering creation of the scholarship a separate and 
unnecessary action not narrowly tailored to the compelling interest. 
If the state is successful in articulating that the interest it purports 
to establish is fcmnd in educational divcrsity2IO even though the state 
is not an educational institution,211 the Act would still likely not be 
narrowly tailored. first, the Act docs not require applicants to attend 
universities with an underrepresented group of students whose 
parents arc immigrants; thus, there is no assurance of crc~lting the 
http://W\\W.stcltehealthf:Kts.org/compardxu·.jsp~ind= 14&cat= I (last visited Feb. 4, 2012) 
(illustrating tlut the distribmion ofpovcrtv in the United States is 14'){, white, 36% black, 35% 
Hispanic, cllld 23% percent l(>r othn). 
206. 110 ILL. COM I'. STAT. '>47/67 (2011 ). 
207. !d. 305j7e-5 (2011) . . ~{·c;z/m IS ILL. Co.\11'. STAT. 505/16.5 (201 1). 
20X. H.R. 0060, '>3d Gen. Assemh. (Ill. 2003), ;w;ulzbk at 
http:/ jwww .ilga.g< >v/lcgislati<m/billstatus.asp~ J)ocN um = 
0060&CAID=3&CA ='>3&DocTypdD=l IB& I xgm= I <>S&Session!D= 3&SpccSess=. 
20'>. II 0 ITT.. COM I'. STAT. 305/7c-5 (20 II) (making in-state tuition available to 
citizens, residents, and non-residents who submit an attidavit stating an intent to become .1 
permanent resident '\lt the earliest opportunity the individual is eligible to do so."). 
210. Sec (;ruttcr v. Bollinger, 53'> U.S. 306 (2003) (articulating thclt educational 
divcrsitv is cl compelling interest). 
211. ,kc I I. R. 0060, '>3d Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2003 ), ;w;ulzbk at 
http:/ fwww. i lga.gov/lcgislation/billstatus.asp? I )<>eN um = 
0060&GAI 1)=3&C.;A='>3& J)ocTypell )= HB&I .egll )=I <>S&Sessionll)= 3&SpecSess = 
(noting that the Act serves to modi!\• the operating of public universities, illustrating how the 
sute itself is not ell\ educational institution). 
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diverse arrav of views in which the state takes an intcrcst. 212 Nor is 
the state in the best position to create diverse educational settings, ~1s 
universities determine admissions and arc most knowledgeable ~1bout 
the diversity of their student bodies. Additionally, the same day 
Gruttcr was decided to allow educational diversity as a compelling 
interest, the Court ruled on the attempt in Grat:z v. Bollingcr to apply 
that interest. 213 In G1:zt:z, the interest was deemed to not be narrowly 
tailored because the admissions program gave so much weight to 
race that it became the deciding bctor in admitting studcnts.214 The 
ditlcrcncc between Gl:zt:z and Gruttcr as the Court articulated it is 
that seeking to achieve diversity in the educational setting is tine, but 
race cannot overshadow other qualifications. 215 Like in Gnzt:z, the 
Illinois DREAM Act uses a suspect classification as the determining 
hctor f(>r eligibility and hils to be narrowly tailored to achieve any 
alleged diversity goal. furthermore, in (,'ruttCI; the Court 
emphasized the need to treat people as individuals21 6 and not just as 
members of groups.217 While this Act purports to be selecting 
individual applicants, it docs so only after preventing other groups 
from applying, again making it br from narrowly tailored. 21 X 
Likewise, the Act will not succeed in an argument of remedying 
past discrimination. The Act is <>Vcr-inclusivc, allowing children who 
arc immigr~lnts thcmsclvcs, 21 'J undocumented alicns,220 and United 
States citizens to apply, 221 while also leaving open the possibility f(>r 
any one of these to be ultimately incligible.222 Thcrd(>rc, the statute 
c1nnot be narrowly tailored in remedying past discrimination when 
212. 110 ILL. CO.~! I'. STAT. 'J47/67 (2011) (noting no university stipulation attached to 
scholarship guidclin<"s). 
213. <..;rat£ v. Bollingn, S3'J U.S. 244, 26X (2003). 
214. !d. .lt 246. 
215. !d 
216. Sec Gruttn v. Bollint>;n, 53<) U.S. 306, at 334 (2003) ( emphasi£int>; the need l(>r 
individual review instead of grouping). 
217. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. \'.Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I, SSI U.S. 701, 743 
(2007). 
21X. 110 ILL. COM!'. STAT. 'J47/67(c) (2011). 
21 Y. !d. (allowing someone who was horn ;!broad hut movl'd her<' with a parent to he 
eligible). 
220. !d. (allowing someone who was horn ;lbnud hut moved here illegallv with a parent 
to he eligible). 
221. !d. (allowing someone who was horn hne afi:n parents .1lreadv immigrated hnc to 
he clit>;ihlc). 
222. !d. (nuking someone ineligible tf their parents did not immigrate to the United 
St.ltes, l'\Tll if thcv bll into one of the other three cncgorics). 
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members of the group f(mncrly discriminated against arc both 
included and potentially excluded at the same time under the 
application of the remedying law.223 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As identified in this Note, to establish a viobtion of the Equal 
Protection Clause, the first requirement is that some fcm11 of "state 
action" exists. 224 Illinois' Public Act 097-0233 is by definition and in 
its nature an Act passed by the process of bicameralism and 
presentment and, thcrdc:>rc, constitutes "state action. "225 The Illinois 
Scmte proposed and approved Senate Bill 2185,226 the Illinois 
House of Representatives approved the bill, 227 and the Governor of 
Illinois signed it into law. 22X These acts-proposing, approving, 
enacting, and eventually enforcing-<lrc direct actions taken by the 
state and thus "state action" f(>r purposes of an equal protection 
analysis. 
The state meets the second requirement by creating a 
classification by drawing distinctions along class lines in the wording 
of the statute. The classification created is one established under 
alienage or national origin,229 which arc suspect classifications 
requiring the application of the strict scrutiny test. 23° The stahltc, 
E1lling short of meeting a compelling state interest or being narrowly 
tailored to achieve any such interest if one did exist, E1ils the strict 
scrutinv test. 231 
223. ld (noting thar bcc1usc the Acr docs not address rhc individual .1pplving, similar 
pcopk in similar .situations will be treated ditkrcntlv based on their parents' statuses). 
224. Recent lkvdopmcnts, Sllf"" note 2S, at 1237. 
22S. Illinois DREAM Act, Pub. Act No. 97-233 (20 II). 
226. H.R. 21X5, 97th Gen. Asscmb. (Ill. 2011 ), ;w.ul;~h/c ;It 
http://www.ilgcLgov/kgislation/Bii!Sratus.asp?DocNum=21XS&(;A[J)= I I & J)c>eTvpcll)= SB 
&Scssionll)=X4&GA=97. 
227. Jd 
22X. ld 
229. Supm Part lll.C. 
230. ld 
231. Supr.1 l'.lrt ll .D. 
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While compelling interests have been t(mnd in suspect 
classifications in the past under equal protection an~1!yscs,232 this docs 
not give a legislative body or government free rci<rn to blindlv 
C L •· L b ,.,· 
"discriminate on the basis of race" to achieve a "worthy goal." 2"" The 
statute draws from "immutable characteristics determined solclv hv 
the accident of birth "234-charactcristics beyond personal contn;l. 1;1 
bet, the Supreme Court in P{vlcr v. Doc articulated the exact 
sittution this Act creates: "children who arc plaintitls in these cases 
'can atkct neither their parents' conduct nor their own st~ltus."'2 35 
The children eligible f(ll· the DREAM Act scholarship arc just like the 
children ineligible f(>r this scholarship; to treat them ditlcrcntly docs 
them an injustice bcf(m: their journey into higher education even 
begins. Public Act 97-233 needs to be repealed bd(>l-c it is t(nmd 
unconstitutional f(>r violating the fourteenth Amendment. Allowing 
it to continue wastes resources as well as time of both the state and 
the individual applicants whose ctl<>rts will be f(>r naught once the 
statute is deemed unconstitutional. 236 
The Illinois DREAM Act has implications outside of Illinois and 
the United States Constitution, too. When legislative acts like this arc 
executed on unstable f(nmdations, they give Elise hope and security 
to the people who rely on thcm.237 Student applicants, who arc 
potentially undocumented immigrants, run the severe risk of being 
ousted after revealing their alien status, feeling that programs like this 
arc aimed to help thcm.23X While it may be true that such laws arc 
being created to aid undocumented students, their legal sutuscs 
cannot be modified or changed by the state, 239 as adjustment of legal 
232. Sec Grurtcr v. Bollinger, 53<) lJ .S. 306 ( 2003) (overcoming strict scrutinv analysis). 
233. l'cm.'nts Involved in Cmtv. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I, 551 U.S. 70 I, 743 
(2007). 
234. Fronticro v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 6X6 ( 1973). 
235. l'lykr v. Doc, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (I 'JX2 ). 
236. Appointmcnn·, supr:z note 95 (the more time the stclte continues on this endeavor, 
the more moncv it will spend on it, in addition to whcltevcr mew happen to the recipients when 
this is deemed unconstitutional). 
237. .~(·c f';z.;sing the J)JU:'A}vf Act, Sllf'J:J note I 0 ( postings bv individuals who cl!T 
t-eh·ing on the Federal DREAM Act). 
23X. Jd (postings on Senator Durbin's website include names. Additionallv, bccntse the 
Illinois DREAM hmd Commission is operated in part through ISAC, it mew he subject to 
Freedom of Int<>rmation Act requests, potentially making applicants' immigration sutuses 
known to the public). 
239. .kc DIFTZ FT AI.., supr;z note I 0. 
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status requires federal action. 240 Thus, state programs arc creating 
potentially troubling situations241 with little to gain when the 
programs arc based on unconstitutional grounds. 
Other states already implementing or considering simibr 
legislation242 should consider this analysis, as it may also apply to 
their acts. Given the importance of these bills to the individuals being 
assisted, ensuring their constitutionality and ability to be upheld is of 
the utmost importance. 243 One individual is believed to have taken 
his lite because he believed he could no longer pursue his dream after 
a version of the federal DREAM Act E1iled to pass.244 While state 
acts serve significantly diflercnt goals than the proposed federal Act 
and the previous example is likely extreme, the emotions that 
surround the state bills arc still very important to potentially affected 
individuals. 245 Illinois and any state considering this type of 
legislation should remedy constitutional violations prior to giving 
t:1lsc hope or awarding monies to individuals. This will prevent other 
individuals from experiencing similar letdowns and tragedy when 
such acts arc t<:mnd unconstitutionaJ.246 
This Act's fatal flaw is the state's participation; without that 
participation, the Act is not subject to an equal protection analysis. 247 
The Illinois legislators adamant about aiding the sihlation of 
immigrant and undocumented children alikc24X have taken the first 
step by making already-existing higher education tlmding available to 
240. !d. 
241. Sec f'.IS.\JliJ.; the J)JUoALH Act; supm note 10. 
242. .~<x Aswini Anburajan, Sratc-/w-Statc !'ush fi>r a /)rc;Jm Act, T!!E Atv!ER!C\J'.: 
l'ROSI'F< :T (Mar. 2X, 20 II), http://prospect.orwJrticlr/sUte-statr-push-drc.lm-clCt (stating that 
several sutes, such as Marvland, New York, and Calit(mJia, have passed or have pending 
"Dream Act-like bills"). 
243. Sec f'.ISSJlli!; the J)RJ,A;H Act, supu note 10. Sec aim Ill. Coalition f(>r Immigranr 
& R.di1gee Rights, lhv Rdin·c JJJU:A;H ~"ore Swdcin\ ?:ilk Ahout DRloA1H Act & Suiudc 
(Ike. 7, 20 I 0 ), http:/jicirr.orgjes/conrent/day-drcam-v<>te-students-talk-about-dream-act-
suicide. 
244. Rrvan Llenas, f:umk Sw1<!1 lw C/;uin t!ut Tcm Killed Hiinsc/FOJn·JJRf.>tH Act, 
Fox NEWS LATIJ'.:O (Dec. 5, 2011), 
http:/ /Iatino. I( 1x news .o >m/lati 11< >/news/20 I I/ 12/0 5 /su icide-lcttcr-o mlirms-teen-killed -hi msel t~ 
< l\'er-dream-act-bm ily-sa vs/. 
245. Sec l'.~.>sJl~f!; the J)RloA/''1 Act, sup1:1 note I 0. 
246. .S<-c I Jcnc1s, supra note 244. 
247. Recent lkvclopments, supr;lnote 25, at 123X. 
24X . . kc H.R. 21X5, 97th (;en. Assemb. 20 (Ill. 2011), ;Jl'.llld>lc .It 
hrrp://www.ilga.gov/lcgislation/Bii!Starus.asp? DocNum=21 H5&GAI D= II & DocTvpdl )= SB 
&SessionlD=X4&GA=<J7; H.R. FlOOR DFBATE, sup1:1 nore 122, at 179. 
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all Illinois citizens. 24<J The scholarship portion of the Act-the only 
portion violating equal protection-should be severed from the Act, 
and the same legislators should f(mn a private organization, privately 
run and privately funded, to provide DREAM scholarships. Giwn 
that the existing scholarship is alrc1dy "privately funded,"2SO the 
org~mization would be in the same position for ~lLqmnng 
contributions, and, because the organization would be priv,ltc, it 
could be established in a relatively short period of time. 251 
Additiotully, state universities ~1re in a better position to 
administer scholarships to undocumented or immigrant children. 
The interests laid out in Gruttcr establish that a university "has a 
compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body," and 
thcrd(>re is the proper ~wemte to implement such scholarships.252 
While a university cannot implement the same program as the one 
enacted by the st~ue, it can begin taking into consideration 
undocumented or immigrant statuses of individuals and potenti~1lly 
otkr these students scholarships to entice them to come to a 
particular university in order to encourage diverse viewpoints in the 
educational setting. 25" 
By enacting progr~1ms that aft(>rd assistance to immigLmt and 
undocumented students, the state is providing a positive message on 
how the state sees and values such individuals.254 Hovvevcr, enacting 
unconstitutional legislation to tltrther that view serves no one, no 
matter how strong the desire to promote it. The portion of this Act 
that puts cvc1:vonc in the state on equal f(>oting is a commendable 
eH<>rt, and the state should not let that progress be overshadowed by 
the unconstitutional portions of the Act. Instead, Public Act 97-233, 
24<J. 110 l!.I.. COM!'. STAT. "0Sj7e-S (201 I) (making in-state tuition available to 
citi1.em, residents, ,md non-residents who stthmit '\11 aflidavit suting an intent to become 'l 
pcrmanem residem "at the earliest opportunitY the individu,ll is eligible to do so."). 
2SO. .~(·c AJ>pointmcnn·, supu note <JS. 
2S 1. However, the old organiz,ltion should not be transtl:rred outright to the pri\\lte 
org.mization, as there m,l\' still he state action. 5(·c Evans v. Newton, "X2 U.S. 2<)6, "OI 
(I <J66) ("[ VV [e em not take judicial notice th,u the mere substitution of trustees instantly 
rr,mskrred this park ti·om the public to the private sector."). 
252. Crutter v. Bollinger, 53<) US 306, 30<) (2003). 
253. Jd 
254. .~(-c Grwcrnor Quinn Sit{nS 1/!tiwil J)JU:JIA1 Act, ILI.INOIS c;ovi:R:-.JMFNT NFWS 
NETWORK (Aug. I, 2011 ), 
http :jjwww. ill in< >is.g< >v/prcssrcleases/Sh,,wPress RcJc,\sc .din) Subject! I)= 2& Rec N um =<J5X7 
(quoting Senator Cullcrron: "lmmigr.lllts arc a driving t(>rce in our citv's ndtttr,ll ,md economic 
lik," emphasizing the value Illinois pbces on its immigr.lllt popuLltion). 
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creating the Illinois DREAM fund Commission, should be repealed 
by the state bd()re being repealed in the courts. 
Wilkun Wojn;Jrmvsk? 
* William Wojnarowski is a third-ve,lr law studem at Northern Illinois Univnsitv College of 
Law. While he is not eligible t<>r the scholarship outlined in this Act, both his girltrimd and 
brher arc, initiallv making him question the consriturionalirv of the Act. He would like to 
thank his fll11ilv ,llld girlti·iend f(>r their love and support, as well as his mmtor lknurdo 
[s,Kovici, whom he has worked with to deknd individuals in deportation removal proceedings. 
Mr. vVojnarowski would like to sec a constitution,!! resolution to immigrc1tion rdim11. 
